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The Next Years
INTHE twoyearsfollowing June 16, 1933, when the National
Industrial Recovery Act was signed and the Recovery Administra-
tion set up, labor unions gained 900,000 members. The increase
was much greater in the first than in the second year. During
1933—34, 635,000 members were added. During 1934—35,' for
1 This increase is considerably less than the increase of 437,300 dues-paying members
from 1934 to 1935 as reported by the Executive Council of the American Federation
of Labor (Report to 55th Annual Convention, October 1935, p. 7). The difference
is to be explained by the lag between the increase in the membership upon which
dues are paid to theF. of L. by certain unions and the increase in the actual
membership of these unions, by virtue of which most of the increase in affiliated
membership from 1934 to 1935, reported by the Federation, is given in the tables
of this study as occurring between 1933 and 1934. For example, the United Mine
Workers paid dues to the A. F. of L. on the basis of a constant membership between
1933 and 1934 whereas the actual membership given in this study (see Appendix,
Table I) increased nearly 200,000. In 1935 the United Mine Workers paid dues to the
A. F. of L. on the basis of an increase in membership of 100,000 whereas the actual
membership increased only 16,400. Lags of this kind account for the difference of
only 15,000 between the membership of affiliated unions as reported by the Execu-
tive Council of the A. F. of L. for the year 1935 and the actual membership for
1934 as reported in this study. A tabulation comparing the reported and the actual
total membership of affiliated unions for the years 1932—35 is presented below. The
actual membership of affiliated and independent unions in 1934 and 1935, by groups,
is given in the Appendix, Table XI.
ACTUAL AND REPORTED MEMBERSHIP OF AFFILIATED UNIONS
CHANCE FROM CHANCE FROM
YEAR ACTUAL PRECEDINC YEAR REPORTED PRECEDING YEAR
1932 2,497,000 2,532,300
1933 2,317,500 —179,500 2,126,801) —405,500
1934 3,030,000 +712,500 2,608,000 +481,200
1935 3,317,100 +287,100 3,045,300 +437,300
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which preliminary figures are available, unions affiliated with the.
American Federation of Labor gained only' 287,000, independent
unions lost 7,000, making a net gain for all unions of 280,000
members. -
Whetherthis decided slackening in the rate of increase is only
a pause in the advance or foreshadows an early termination of
the present upward trend depends mainly on the ability of the
labor movement to establish itself in the traditionally unorgan-
ized industries. Considerable as the gain of nearly 1,000,000 mem-
bers in two years is, it is restricted largely to industries, such as
coal and clothing in which unionism has for a long period of time
been accepted in substantial parts of the industry by both em-
ployers and working men. Meanwhile the non-union inanufactur-
ing industries of steel, automobiles, rubber and textiles, the pub-
lie utilities other than railroads, the distributive trades and the
services remain, with relatively minor exceptions, almost entirely
unorganized. So far as these industries are concerned some ob-
servers believe that New Deal policies have reversed traditional
trends and laid the foundation for successful labor organization.
Though much in recent events would suppori the view that gov-
ernmental policy may play a determining role in industrial rela-
tions, the history of organized labor in the United States suggests
that the fortunes of the labor movement during the next years
will continue to reflect, in addition to developments in govern-
mental labor and economic policy, the attitude of employers, the
state of mind of employees, the condition of business, and the
internal relations of the labor movement. Any one of these ele-
ments of the situation may on occasion prove to be the most im-THE NEXT YEARS 149
portant, hut reasonable expectations as to the future of trade
unionism must rest on an appraisal of all.
1. Labor Policy of the Government
The recent labor policy of the Federal government has already
passed through several phases. In the first phase, lasting for the
duration of the NRA, trade unionism received a powerful im-
petus from the application of Section 7(a)of the Recovery Act
and the participation by many union officials in the Recovery
Administration.
The Act and the machinery of administration were suspended
soon after the decision of the United States Supreme Court on
May 27, 1935. By the end of the year most of the skeleton ad-
ministration, retained in anticipation of possible new legislation
and occupied with assessing the value and meaning of the old,
had gone. Efforts to establish voluntary codes of fair competition,
among other purposes for the regulation of working conditions,
proved unsuccessful. While organized labor and some officials in
the administration appeared eager to revive the NRA, there was
little evidence that immediate steps were contemplated. The dis-
taste for monopolistic practices which experience with the NRA
aroused in Congress and the growing opposition of business, to
the operations of the Recovery Act made the enactment of simi-
lar legislation in the near future seem improbable.
Organized labor, however, continued its pressure for new leg-
islation, Much as the unions had criticized the shortcomings of
the NRA, they strongly approved the regulation of both indus-
trial practices and labor relations contemplated by the Recovery
Particularly in industries in which unions believed they had
suffered from the effects of unregulated competition and the di-150EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
version of business and plant from organized to unorganized lo-
calities were they insistent on the restoration of governmental
control. They believed that organized labor was making its great-
est gains in such industries as coal and railroads where govern-
mental intervention has been most far-reaching and where regu-
latory measures have gone far beyond the mere guarantee of the
right to organize and to bargain collectively.
Under the influence of these examples of the apparent bene-
fits of state control, the labor movement has bad a radical change
of heart. It has cast aside traditional opposition to legislation in
its desire to win the support of the government. At first averse to
•fixing minimum wages in the NRA codes of fair competition, or-
ganized labor in the later stages of the Recovery Administration
fought unremittingly to incorporate complete wage scales in them.
It has gone far since June 1933 in its views as to the proper limits
of state action. And it has been exerting powerful pressure on the
executive and legislative branches of the government not only to
strengthen the legal position of trade unions, but also to provide
those measures of control over industry which, in its judgment,
will afford it effective protection against the harmful conse-
quences of competitive business practice.
The first effects of these activities of the labor movement were
the enactment of one law for the regulation of the bituminous
coal industry and another for the control of industrial relations
throughout American industry. The Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion (Guffey-Snyder) Act,2 approved by the President on August
30, 1935, set up a bituminous coal code, provided for the fixing
of minimum and maximum prices, authorized the establishment
2 Public No. 402, 74th Congress, HR. 9100.THE NEXT YEARS 151
of marketing agencies, and imposed control over labor relations
considerably more thorough-going and drastic than the provisions
of Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The
following excerpts from the statement of policy of the Coal Con-
servation Act describe its general purposes:
"It is... recognized... thatall production of bituminous coal
and distribution by the producers thereof bear upon and directly affect
its interstate and render regulation of all such production
and distribution imperative...; thatthe excessive facilities for the
production of bituminous coal and the overexpansion of the industry
have led to practices and methods of production, distribution and mar-
keting ... thatwaste such coal resources of the Nation, disorganize
the interstate commerce in such coal and portend the destruction of the
industry itself... thatcontrol of such production and regulation of
the prices realized by the producers thereof are necessary to promote
its interstate commerce ... andprotect the national public interest
thereof;...andthat the right of mine workers to organize and coi-
lectively bargain for wages, hours of labor, and conditions of employ-
ment, should be guaranteed in order to prevent constant wage cutting
and the establishment of disparate labor costs detrimental to fair com-
petition in the interstate marketing of bituminous coal, and in order
to avoid those obstructions to its interstate commerce that recur in the
industrial disputes over labor relations at the mines."
The specific provisions of this Act, following the principles
enunciated in its statement of policy, were aimed at practices that
many unions have long held responsible for their weakness and
instability. Price-fixing was designed to protect the prevailing
national structure of wage rates and thus to limit, if not to pre-
vent, the movement of business from high to iow wage areas un-
der the stress of unfavorable competitive conditions. Organized
marketing, it was hoped, would contribute to the same end.
Measures essentially directed at restricting the output of an in-
dustry were designed to reduce 'excessive facilities' of production152EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
and to remove or temper the incentives to price- and wage-cutting.
The terms of the Act dealing with labor relations (Part Ill) as-
serted the right of employees to "peaceable assemblage for the
discussion of the principles of collective bargaining", to "select
their own checkweighmen to inspect the weighing or measuring
of coal", and to refuse "as a condition of employment to live in
company homes or to trade at the store of an employer". The Bi-
tuminous Coal Labor Board, created by Act, was empowered
"to determine whether or not an organization of employees has
been promoted or i.s controlled or dominated by an employer in
its organization, management, policy, or election of representa-
Lives; and for the purpose of determining who are the freely
chosen representatives of the employees the Board may order
andiinder its supervision may conduct an election of employees
for that purpose."
The most comprehensive substitute for the labor clauses of the
National Industrial Recovery Act is the National Labor Relations
Act, approved by the President, July 5, 1935. This law does not
undertake to regulate wages, hours and working conditions. It is
a purely labor relations measure. As such it goes far beyond Sec-
tion 7(a) of the NRA, whose place it takes in the labor law of
the country. Like Section 7(a) its purpose is to further collective
bargaining through independent organizations of employees and
to discourage employers from interfering with the exercise by
employees of their right to organize, to bargain through their
freely chosen representatives, and to join or refrain from joining
any labor organization. Drafted after the government had had
some experience with the difficulties of applying Section 7(a),
the National Labor Relations Act differs from its predecessor in
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wide powers of enforcement it bestows on the National Labor
Relations Board. In its course through Congress the bill aroused
the almost unanimous opposition of employers. Unsuccessful efL
forts were made to amend the bill by defining and prohibiting
unfair practices of trade unions. Its adoption left employers re-
sentful and recalcitrant.
In its first eight months of operation ending May 30, 1936, the
National Labor Relations Board and its twenty-one regional of-
fices received charges of unfair labor practices, or petitions for
elections to determine employee representation, in 982 cases, in-
volving 204,107 workers.3 Complaints presented to the Board
have continued to multiply with great rapidity and 'the Board
appealed to Congress for an additional appropriation required by
the expansion of its activities. The larger employers have chal-
lenged the authority of the Board and have refused to submit
to its decisions. The Board' has consequently become involved in
extensive litigation in all parts of the country. In several in-
stances the lower Federal courts have issued injunctions restrain-
ing the Board from proceeding with its inquiries and findings.
In the majority of cases they have refused to issue injunctions,
pending decisions of the higher courts. The constitutionality of
the Act and the powers of the Board will in all probability be
determined by the Supreme Court within the year. Meanwhile
the general defiance of the law has seriously impaired the effec-
tiveness of the Labor Relations Board. In the circumstances its
contribution to the growth of unionism has not been considerable.
The Bituminous Coal Act contained provisions which, if en-
forced, would have inevitably resulted in strengthening the posi-
Cases Handled by 1V.L.R.B. for May and Cumulative to Date (mimeographed re•
lease), June 19, 1936.154EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
tion of the United Mine Workers. The following provisions of
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (Part III, sec. g), while
aimed at standardizing wages and hours within competitive areas,
would have had the additional effect of extending union member-
ship throughout the areas to which they applied.
"Whenever the maximum daily and weekly hours of labor are agreed
upon in any contract or contracts negotiated between the producers of
more than two-thirds of the annual national tonnage production for the
preceding calendar year and the representatives of more than one-half
the mine workers employed, such maximum hours of labor shall be
accepted by all the code members. The wage agreement or agreements
negotiated by collective bargaining in any district or group of two or
more districts, between representatives of producers of more than two-
thirds of the annual tonnage production of such district or each of such
districts in a contracting group during the preceding calendar year, and
representatives of the majority of the mine workers therein, shall be
filed with the Labor Board and shall be accepted as the minimum wages
for the various classifications of labor by the code members operating
insuchdistrict or group of districts."
In the National Labor Relations Act, the so-called 'majority
rule' clause (Sec. 9a) and the authority vested in the National
Labor Relations Board to fix the unit of employee-representation
(Sec. 9b) may in practice result in requiring members of minOr-
ity groups to join organizations of the majority:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right to present grievances to their employer.
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to
employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to col-
lective bargaining, ... theunit appropriate for the purposes of collec-THE NEXT YEARS 155
five bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof."
Experience with these laws has been brief, but they have on
the whole won the unqualified support of most unions. The spec-
tacular rehabilitation of the United Mine Workers under the in-
fluence of the NRA and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
and the increase in the membership of the railroad unions re-
sulting from the application of the amended Railway Labor
Act have strengthened the faith of many leaders of organized
labor in the efficacy of governmental intervention. Moved by the
same considerations the textile unions urged Congress to pass the
National Textile Act, a bill aimed at the regulation of wages and
other working conditions, unfair competitive practices, and the
methods of industrial relations in the cotton, rayon, silk and wool
divisions of the textile industry.4
With these aims of organized labor, the Federal administration
appears to be sympathetic. The Waish-Healey Act, passed by the
last session of the 74th Congress and approved by the President,
establishes the 'regulation of wages and labor conditions in the
manufacture of products sold to departments of the Federal gov-
ernment. Immediately after the adverse decision of the United
States Supreme Court, May 18, 1936, on the constitutionality of
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act; an amended bill, limited
to provisions for price-fixing and the regulation of output, was
introduced in the Congress, apparently with the support of the
Administration. A filibuster led by the junior Senator from West
Virginia prevented the bill from being brought to a vote before
the adjournment of Congress; but there is every indication that
H.R. 11770, 74th Congress, 2nd Session.156EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
a similar measure will be introduced in the first session of the
next Congress early in 1937.
..Attitudeof Employers
The dominant opinion of American employers has rarely been
sympathetic with organized labor. Owners and managers of in-
dustry have long opposed what ihey regard as the burdens and
•infiexibilities of union agreements. They prize highly the bene-
•fits of freedom of management and they reject union rules which,
in their judgment, tend to retard advances in technology and in
methods o,f factory management to which they ascribe the rising
productivity of labor and industry and the high levels of Amen-
can wages. Both during the World War and under the NRA em-
ployers generally viewed with alarm the close relations being
forged between government and organized labor, and no small
part of the revulsion against war control over industry and against
the NRA in 1934 was due to the prevalence of this state of mind.
In the history of industrial relations employers' opposition to
unionism has assumed a variety of Particularly before the
War, campaigns for unionization often developed into fierce con-
tests for supremacy marked by extensive violence and riots. What-
ever the merits of the dispute, the outcome was determined by
the strength of the contestants. Intimidation and coercion were
widely used on both sides and the power of employers in these•
struggles was not infrequently enhanced by the use of elaborate
and expensive systems of company guards and by control of local
public authorities. The deep antagonisms which long prevailed
in our labor relations account for such periodic eruptions as the
Homestead and Pullman strikes and explain the violence that hasTHE NEXT YEARS 157
characterized strikes and lockouts in this country for so many
years.
While these methods still persist, they have come to be re-
placed in many industries by more direct, peaceful and construc-
tive measures designed to win the loyalty of employees and to
keep them indifferent to labor organization. The widespread de-
velopment of company welfare plans, generally adopted not much
before 1920, is evidence of the radical alteration in the labor
policy of industry. Group life insurance, amounting in 1912 to
only 13 million dollars, is now well in excess of 10 billion and
is being extensively purchased by employers. Thrift and stock-
purchase plans were widely introduced during this period.
These devices of 'welfare capitalism' have multiplied swiftly in
number and variety. No adequate. description of them exists in
the available literature. The standards of personnel management
in American industry have been vastly improved during the last
twenty years. Methods of hiring and firing and handling shop
grievances have been transformed with the introduction of stand-
ard procedures and the transfer of authority from foremen to
employment and personnel managers. A recent surveyof the in-
dustrial relations of 2,452 cQmpanies shows that companies em-
ploying 1,457,000 employees furnish some form of dismissal
compensation; those employing 1,530,000, group health and ac-
cident insurance; 2,727,000, group life insurance; 2,628,000,
loans to employees; and 1,589,517, relief funds.
At the same time there has been a considerable development
in new forms• of employee-representation. Labor conditions dur-
Industrial Conference. Board, What Employers are Doing for Employees,
Report No. 221, 1936. This report is the most comprehensive account available of
the numerous welfare activities of American employers.•158EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
ing the World War and the activities of governmental labor
boards became powerful stimuli to the spread of collective bar-
gaining. An increasing number of companies then began their
experiments with company or plant systems of representation.
The number of employees working under arrangements of this
kind increased from 400,000 in 1919 to 1,300,000 in 1926.8 With
the persistence of prosperity and the decline in strikes during the
1920's, the interest of employers in the promotion of employee-
representation seemed to lag and the number of plans declined.
But the aggressive organizing campaigns by union labor associated
with the NRA shortly produced a new crop of representation
plans. The number of plans and of employees under their juris-
diction multiplied with such rapidity that their present coverage
may well exceed that of the trade unIons.
The welfare activities of industry and company and plant
forms of representation have, it is generally conceded, served as
effective barriers against the• advance of organized labor. While
the indifference to unionism during the 1920's reflected in part
the prosperity of the period, improvements in labor policy were
by no means an inconsiderable factor in the situation. The vast
•expansion in employee-representation plans since the summer of
1933 has added to the disputes in industrial relations, for the
new plans set up by the employers have been vigorously attacked
by the trade unions as lacking the essential qualities of genuine
instruments of collective bargaining. Whatever the force of these
charges, many of the plans. but recently initiated have already
been revised to meet criticism, since new works councils like new
unions are often, in their early stages, inactive and impotent. In,
6RecentSocial Trends (McGraw.Hill, 1933), II, 845.THE NEXT YEARS 159
industries dominated by large factories and central ownership
efforts have been made to strengthen the works councils both by
amending their rules and regulations and by raising the standards
of factory management.
The future of employee-representation plans and company
unions, like that of trade unions, is at present more uncertain
than ever, In several industries the trade unions have succeeded
in capturing employee-representatives and their constituents in
individual shops and plants. But the larger plans of employee-
representation still remain intact. A decisive test of the relative
stability of these alternative methods of industrial relations is
now being made in the iron and steel industry where the organ-
ization drive by, the Committee for Industrial Organization is in
essence an assault on the employee-representation plans in oper-
ation in that industry. Whatever happens there is bound to have
swift repercussions in American industry generally.
3. Attitude of Employees
What the true attitude of employees towards organization has
been and what, changes, if any, it has recently undergone are
questions as hard to answer' as they are crucial. The limited ex-
tent of American trade unionism is attributed by some to the co-
ercive pressure of employers and by others to the characteristic
independence of workmen in this country and their unwillingness
to submit to the regulations and disciplines of the trade union.
To prove either view is obviously impossible. Various clues to
labor's opinion, such as the results of elections held to choose
employee representatives or the trends in strikes, fall short of
affording convincing and acceptable evidence. Except in the rail-
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conducted by the labor boards in the last several years has been
inconclusive, if for no other. reason than that these polls have
covered so small a fraction of the employees eligible to vote. Be-
yond this, differences in the conditions preceding and surround-
ing the elections and in their administration limit their value as
indexes of labor's sentiments. If the prevalence of unrest be a
measure of workmen's dissatisfaction with existing conditions and
the intensity of their desire for unionization, the record of strikes
and lockouts since 1930 fails to disclose a mounting tide of dis-
content of unusual proportions. Although the number of labor
disputes has been increasing, there were fewer in 1935 than dur-
ing any year of the World War and not' many more than in the'
recovery of
The number of cases currently submitted to the National Labor
Relations Board can hardly be regarded as evidence of the exist-
ence of widespread labor unrest. In the latest summary of its
operations,8 the Board reported that in the eight months ending
May 30, 1936, it had acted in 982 cases involving 204,107 workers.
Since employees are customarily moved to demand wage increases
and other concessions during business recovery, the number of
disputes evoked in the last few years by the substantial revival
in business does not appear unusually great. Moreover, since many
of the disputes brought before the Board arise in the course of
organizing, campaigns and are presented by union organizers en-
gaged in efforts to increase union membership, even these figures
are subject to discount as a measure of the dissatisfaction of labor.
Much the same conclusion may be deduced from the
of union organizers and officers with new members. While sub-
7MonthlyLabor Review, U.S. Bureau of LabOr Statistics.
8Mimeographedrelease, June 19, 1936.THE NEXT YEARS 161
stantial numbers flock into the union in the early, vigorous stages
of organizing campaigns, great difficulty is rencoüntered in keeping
them in the ranks of the union. After they have paid the small
initiation fee and perhaps several months dues, they stop making
payments. and thereby surrender their membership. For this rea-
son many American unions look with favor on the check-off,
whereby dues are collected from union members by the employer
and are paid by 'him to the union.
The absence of deeply-rooted class antagonisms would appear.
to account now as in the past for .the transitory character of much
of American union membership and for the failure of the labor
,movement to respond to powerful incentives and support. De-
scribing the development of the policies of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, an acute and informed historian of the American
labor movement writes:
"The overshadowing problem of the American 'labor movement has
always been the problem of staying organized. No other labor move-
ment has ever had to contend with the fragility so. characteristic of
American labor organizations. In the main this fragility of the organiza-
tion has come from the lack of class cohesiveness in American labor.
The American unions, after a decade of the weakening competition with
the. Knights of Labor, have seen the need of ruthless suppression of
'dual' unions and of 'outlaw' strikes. It would seem as though, through
this practice, they have tried to make up for a lack of spontaneous class
solidarity, upon which European unions could reckon withcèr-
tainty...
Gompers and his associates were under no delusion as to the true
psychology of American working men, particularly as regards the prac-
ticable limits of their solidarity. They knew that where wage-earners
were held together by the feeling that their jobs came out of a common
•,jobreservoir, as did those in the same or closely related crafts, their
Professor Selig Penman in Penman and Taft, History of Labor in the United
States, 1896—1932 (Macmillan, 1935), pp. 7, 8.162EBB AND FLOW 'IN TRADE UNIONISM
fighting solidarity left nothing to be desired. They also knew, however.
that they had to go slow in pressing on to greater solidarity. Where
conditions made cooperation between different craft groups urgent, it
was best obtained through free cooperation, each union reserving the
right to decide for itself in every situation whether to cooperate ox
not ...Solidarityof the skilled with the unskilled was not precluded,
but it was never assumed as a matter of fact or of moral duty. Rather
it was assumed that a labor group that needed outside aid to give it
the original impulse to assert its independence was something of a que8-
tionable addition to the family of organized labor.
Solidarity, as understood by this group, was thus a solidarity with a
quickly diminishing potency as one passed from the craft group—which
looks upon the jobs in the craft as its common property for which it
is ready to fight long and bitterly—to the widening concentric circles
of the related crafts, the industry, the American Federation of Labor,
and the world labor movement."
4. Business Conditions
Among the forces affecting the attitude of employees and the
condition of organized labor is the state of business and employ-
ment. In the United States, as in other countries, periods of good
business and expanding employment have been considered favor-
able to the spread of trade unionism. In prosperity strikes stand
a greater chance of success. Strikers are harder to replace, and
employers, facing the loss of business and profits, are more in-
clined to yield to demands for better conditions and union recog-
nition. During the prosperity of the 192 0's this rule failed to
work. were.less frequently called and the membership of
unions, except in the building and railroad industries, steadily
declined. The very prosperity of the period and the generally
high standards of wages and employment acted, apparently, in
most classes of industry to retard rather than to accelerate the
pace of union growth.
Similar conditions appear to affect the labor situation duringTHE NEXT YEARS 163
the present business recovery. Wage rates have already been sub-
stantially increased and the average rates in most of the princi-
pal categories of industries are now above 1929. After five lean
years of short employment and meager earnings, the average
workman is reluctant to risk his job at the prevailing high rates
of wages by joining in strikes for union recognition. Hours of
labor, while greater in some instances than under theNRA, are
less than ever before. Manifold types of collective dealings be-
tween employers and employees have been widely installed in in-
dustry, and are actively and, in many places, effectively competing
with the trade union. Unemployment meanwhile continues ab-
normally large and there are few indications that it will be con-
siderably reduced for some years to come. Relatively good
lions of labor for the employed and the potential competition of a
standing army of unemployed, sometimes estimated to exceed 10
million, are elements of the present situation not calculated to en-
courage industrial conflict over the issues of union membership
and recognition.
A continued and prolonged improvement in business and em-
ployment will doubtless result in further increases in union mem-
bership, particularly in those industries and trades in which
organized labor is traditionally strong and union growth depends
less upon proselytizing than upon the return of the unemployed
members to their jobs. Notably in the building and railroad in-
dustries, where the shrinkage in employment since 1929 has been
unusual and the recovery in employment has been so far not con-
siderable, a substantial rise in payrolls may easily within several
years add more than 500,000 to the present union membership.
But this situation, is exceptional.164EBB AND FLOW UNIONISM
5. Internal Relations of the Labor Movement
Except for spontaneous uprisings of workmen, which have been
rare in occurrence and limited in extent, the spread of unionism
is the result of deliberate and planned organizing campaigns.
These efforts are initiated and managed by the established labor
movement. The greater the skill, vigor, and resources of the
movement, the more effective its campaigns are likely to be. Since
the labor movement of the United States is composed largely of
many separate unions, loosely associated for common purposes
in the American Federation of Labor, their combined effective-
ness in organizing as in other activities depends on the unity and
harmony with which they pursue• their objectives.
In the history of American organized labor internal dissension
over competing philosophies, strategy, tactics and structure has
often developed into serious conflict and disruption which have,
temporarily at least, weakened the labor movement and limited
the area of its effectiveness. The successive struggles between the
American Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor, the
I.W.W. and the communist unions have all had this effect. Al-
though the Federation and its constituent unions have survived
these conflicts, the achievement of victory and peace has usually
been costly. Jurisdictional disputes among several unions, of the
type common to the building trades unions, have, likewise, from
time to time threatened the power of these organizations.
The conflict now raging within the American Federation of
Labor over the issue of union structure is the latest serious divi-
sion in the ranks of the labor movement. The parties to the dis-
pute are the. leaders of the powerful groups of craft and industrial
unions within the Federation. The issue that divides them is inTHE NEXT YEARS 165
part the belief of the supporters of industrial unionism that literal
adherence to the jurisdictional claims of craft unions has im-
paired the effectiveness of organizing pressure and prevented the
establishment of new unions in mass.production industries, and
in part the ambition of individual union leaders to achieve power
and supremacy in the movement. The issue was brought to a head
when the advocates of industrial unionism supported the claim of
recently organized unions in the automobile, rubber, and radio
industries, and of an older union in the oil industry, to full juris-
diction over all employees working in these industries, whether
or not any of them are now under the jurisdiction of existing craft
unions.
The split between the advocates of industrial and craft union-
ism, started at the A. F. of L. convention in October 1935, has
already gone far. The Committee for Industrial Organization,
headed by John L. Lewis and formed to marshal the forces of
industrial unionism, has carried on its independent activities in
defiance of the Federation. At its meeting in January 1936 the
A. F. of L. Executive Council noted that the Committee constituted
"a challenge to the supremacy of the American Federation of
Labor" and proposed that "it be immediately dissolved".'0 The
United Mine Workers, meeting several weeks later, unanimously
endorsed the position of their president, John L. Lewis, and the
purposes of the Committee and authorized their officers to with-
hold the payment of dues to the Federation."
The Committee has refused to dissolve. Meanwhile it has en-
gaged in an• extraordinarily aggressive campaign to gain adherents
from among the unions of the country. By July 1936 five unions
10AmericanFederation of Labor, Weekly News Service, February 8, 1936.
11NewYork Times, January 31, 1936. -166EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
—the flat glass, steel, automobile, rubber, and electrical and ra-
dio workers unions—had joined the original eight members of
the C.I.O. The contest for control of the campaign to unionize
the iron and steel industry- was won by the Committee, a.nd the
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers became
an affiliated organization. Efforts of a committee, appointed by
• the A.F. of L. Executive Council, to seek a peaceful settlement
of the controversy appear to have come to naught. The public
commitments of the spokesmen for both parties have been so firm
and uncompromising as to make the retreat of either appear
improbable.
On the merits of the controversy there is sharp difference of
opinion not only among union members but also among stu-
dents of organized labor. Conceding the real dangers of internal
dissension, many, students, nevertheless, see in the proposed
changes in union structure a fundamental and essential reform
which will pave the way for union organization in the great non-
union industries and will in the long run invigorate and strengthen
the labor movement, however great the immediate costof
internal conflict may be. The craft unionists appeal to the history
of' unions in this country for evidence of the superior effective-
ness of organization among workmen who' follow a common and
skilled occupation. On the basis of their experience with Amer-
ican unionism following the decline of the Knights of Labor in
1890 and the short-lived expansion of organization during the
World War, they attribute to craft unions intrinsic unity and
stability which, in their observation, the industrial unions lack.
The changing relation of government to organized labor prom-
ises to be one of the most influential factors in the contemporaryTHE NEXT' YEARS 167
labor situation. The measures considered and adopted since June
1933 and the policy of the government are intended not oniy to
clarify and strengthen the legal status of trade unions but also to
make unions instruments for the regulation of many competitive
business practices. The pursuit and enforcement of these policies
may be expected to stimulate the growth of unionism in this country
and in time to cause radical changes in the rights and responsibili-
ties of organized labor and in its relation to the State.
In a sense these tentative steps in the United States were an-
ticipated by developments in other countries beginning shortly
after the World War. During the War organized labor made un-
precedented gains in membership, 'almost universally. By 1920
world membership appeared to be more than double that of 1914.
In the United States the number of union members increased
from 2,687,100 in 1914 to 5,047,800 in 1920; in Great Britain.
from 4,143,000 to 8,347,000; in Canada from 134,300 to 373,800;
and in Germany from 2,166,000 to more than 9,000,000. Far-
reaching political changes after the war were attended by unusual
divergencies in the course of' trade unionism in different coun-
tries. Russian unions, small and unimportant before the war, mul-
tiplied in number and membership after the revolution until they
were in 1935 the largest of all, claiming more than 18,000,000
meinbers.* After the revolution in Germany and the coming into
power of the Social-Democratic party, the membership of the
Geiman unions rose to new levels and remained at three to four
times its pre-War size until the unions were destroyed in 1932 by
S
* Director's Russian unions are not trade unions in the accepted sense. Mem-
bership therein is compulsory. On the other hand, the unions have become organs
of the government, their officers are appointed by the powers that be and are not
responsibletothe rank andfile. 'Strikesare not tolerated, being regarded
counter-revolutionary or treason to the State.—N. I. Stone168EBB AND FLOW IN TRADE UNIONISM
the National-Socialist Government and replaced by the 'Labor
Front', the Nazi 'classless union' of employers and employees.12
In Italy, likewise, post-War membership exceeded pre-War. Un-
der Fascism and the assertion of governmental control over
unions, membership, as officially reported, rose further and stood
at 4,698,000 in 1934, or five times the membership of
In contrast withthis, union membership in England, France
and the United States is now only moderately larger than it was
before the War. Although the English membership was in 1914
by far the largest in the world, in 1934 it was 4,567,000, or not
much more than one-fourth the membership of the Russian
unions. In spite of the substantial rise in employment in England
union membership in 1934 was no more than 10 per cent above
1914. French data are incomplete but indicate no radical changes
in the position of organized labor in France. Of the labor move-
ments in England, France and the United States, the American
unions sho.w the greatest advance over their pre-War condition,
claiming approximately 1,000,000, or 37 per cent, more members
in 1934 than in 1914.
As these figures indicate, the labor movements in various
countries have in their post-War phase followed separate paths.
In several countries membership in unions is for all practical
purposes èompulsory and unions have become instruments of
government. Their activities and policies, are the subject of pub-
lic control. Collective bargaining for wages and working condi-
tions, the most important function of the traditional union, is
largely subordinated to the policies and' decisions of the State.
12MichaelT. Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism. (Macmillan, 1936), p. 105.
18Themembership of unions in foreign cOuntries, 1914, 1920—34, is given in the
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Labor disputes, when they are not suppressed, are in the main set-
tled by compulsory arbitration. Consequently membership, lim-
ited only by the terms of governmental edicts,iswell-nigh
universal.
In other countries unions continue to be voluntary associations
of workingmen. Membership fluctuates with changes in business
conditions and the hold unions have upon their members; col-
lective bargaining for wages and working conditions remains the
prime function of organized labor; union membership represents
a fraction, of greater or less magnitude, ofall organizable
employees.
While Atherican unions have changed their attitude towards
the regulatiOn of industry by government and have come increas-
ingly to depend on governmental support, they retain the essential
features of free and uncontrolled unionism. In recently enacted
laws they have succeeded in preserving the right to strike and in
preventing the incorporation of provisions that would expose
their operations to more thoroughgoing regulation than now ex-
ists. But the unfolding of present policies of industrial regulation
and collective bargaining may well. expose unions in this country,
as it has in others, to govermnental regulation of their policies
and acts.